UPC-CoA-84/2026 – Yealink v Barco

Court
Court of Appeal
Date
Outcome
Granted
Sector
Electronics/SEP
Decision Type
PROCEDURAL

Expert Commentary

Costs Facts 1. Barco filed for a preliminary injunction (“PI”) at the LD Brussels. 2. Yealink challenged the Court’s competence. 3. The LD Brussels: a. rejected the Preliminary Objection of Yealink; b. dismissed the PI request of Barco because of lack of urgency. 4. Both parties appealed. 5. The Court of Appeal ruled on 28 November 2025: a. ordered Barco to pay the costs of the court of first instance (“CFI”) proceedings; b. awarded an interim award to pay to Yealink of € 66.000; c. ordered that Barco had to pay the costs of the appeal proceedings and the application for suspensive effect; d. ordered that Yealink had to pay Barco’s costs in the cross-appeal. 6. On 29 December 2025, Yealink started cost proceedings. 7. The LD Brussel ordered Barco to pay a (redacted) amount deducted with any interim costs paid. 8. Yealink filed an application for leave to appeal pursuant to R. 221 RoP. 9. Barco started proceedings on the merit on 25 August 2026. The Court of Appeal 1. Barco argued that Yealink did not ask for leave to appeal. This argument is rejected. Yealink filed in one document an application for leave to appeal, a Statement of Appeal and a Statement of the Grounds for Appeal, which is allowed. R. 221 RoP does not always require separate statements. 2. R. 221.2(a) RoP requires that the request for leave to appeal should specify why the appeal should be heard in such a way that the standing judge can decide on the basis of the application. References to specific parts are allowed. 3. Leave to appeal for a cost decision shall be granted if the order is manifestly erroneous or the decision raises a fundamental question of law and its review is necessary for a consistent application of the law. These are the same reasons as for discretionary review. 4. If the applicant invokes “manifest error” it must show that without the error the outcome of the decision would likely have been different. 5. The cost decision may be subject to separate proceedings following within one month after service of the decision on the merit. Therefore, the application in this case filed before the decision in the case on the merit is inadmissible. 6. If there are no proceedings on the merit pending and the applicant was ordered to pay the costs in PI proceedings, the one month period should apply by analogy for the costs in the PI proceedings that the defendant should receive. 7. If a case on the merit is started and the defendant has already started cost proceedings on the basis of the PI decision, these proceedings may continue. If the defendant has not already started cost proceedings and claimant files an appeal the defendant can still ask costs for the PI proceedings after the service of the decision in the case on the merits or also ask for a cost decision within one month after the service of the PI order. The same principles apply on appeal. 8. Regarding the costs of the first instance PI proceedings, Yealink did not file within one month after service. As Yealink did not file within one month of the PI order in First Instance, it can only file these costs after the case on the merit which started on 29 August and is ongoing. 9. With regard to the appeal costs, Yealink filed its costs within one month after the final order of the Court of Appeal. However, considering that Barco initiated proceedings on the merit on 29 August 2025, Yealink should file within one month after the service of the decision of the case on the merit. Therefore, Yealink’s application is inadmissible. “ 27. However, the current inadmissibility of Yealink´s application for a cost determination does not mean that the application for leave to appeal is unfounded. If the impugned decision had material substantive deficiencies as advanced by Yealink that disadvantaged Yealink, Yealink would be adversely affected by the res judicata effect of the denial of its requests. Conversely, if the Local Division had dismissed the requests as currently inadmissible, Yealink could reapply for a cost determination after the decision in the proceedings on the merits had been made. 28. The Brussels Local Division set the recoverable legal costs for the appeal proceedings at 50% of the applicable ceiling. It arrived at this figure by “balancing” the application of [II.] Number 5b) of the Guidelines (“decrease of the value to 66% for the overall PI proceedings”) with the “acceptance” by Barco that the ceiling in the PI first instance should be set at EUR 112,000”. Actually, the Brussels Local Division granted approximately 59% of this ceiling, which was EUR 66,000. 29. 29. When exercising its discretion to determine the value in dispute, the Court “may” take the Guidelines into account (R. 370.6 RoP) but it is not obliged to do so (CoA, 10 June 2026, UPC-CoA-85/2026, para. 27, Speed Care Mineral v Teleflex Life Sciences). If the Court determines the value in dispute according to the Guidelines, the Guidelines must be applied correctly. The provisions in II. Number 5b) of the Guidelines cannot justify decreasing the ceiling to 66%, as the Brussels Local Division did in its first step. II Number 5b) (unchanged by the guidelines amended by decision of the Administrative Committee on 4 November 2025) states that in a case of an application for interim relief which is not followed by an infringement action on the merits the value of an application for interim relief for determining the level of the recoverable costs should be calculated at 66% of the value calculated in accordance with II.1.b) of the Guidelines. 9 30. As the Brussels Local Division correctly held, the Guideline 5b) is not literally applicable because, in this case, an infringement action on the merits followed the PI proceedings. However, even if applied mutatis mutandis it would not follow that the applicable ceiling has to be decreased to 66%. It is the value of the proceedings that has to be decreased to 66%. 31. Even if the value of the appeal proceedings, which the judge-rapporteur of the Brussels Local Division considered to be EUR 1,000,000 would be decreased to 66%, the applicable ceiling would still be up to EUR 112,000. The value of the proceedings would then be EUR 660,000 (66% of EUR 1,000,000). According to the scale of ceilings for recoverable costs, proceedings with a value in dispute of EUR 660,000 still have an applicable ceiling of up to EUR 112,000. 32. To conclude, the impugned decision contains a manifest error.” 10. When the costs exceed the ceiling for recoverable costs, it does not automatically mean that you get the amount of the ceiling. The costs have to be reasonable and proportionate. 11. The applicant in PI proceedings may not file a request for costs before the end of the case on the merit. This means that Barco cannot deduct its costs from the costs requested by Yealink. 12. The Court leaves open the question if compensation is possible without initiating cost proceedings. “VIII. Proceedings under R. 150 RoP et seq. is not a re-examination of which party is entitled to cost reimbursement under Art. 69 UPCA. In proceedings for provisional measures, this decision (hereinafter referred to as “cost allocation”; “répartition des frais” in French; “Kostengrundentscheidung” in German) should be made in the order deciding on the application for provisional measures (see Hanshow v Vusiongroup, para. 37). Similarly, in the proceedings on the merits, the decision on the merits should contain a cost allocation decision (see Hanshow v Vusiongroup para. 38). The only issue subject to separate proceedings for a cost decision pursuant to R. 150 RoP et seq. is cost determination, i.e. the question of which costs to which amount are recoverable (“détermination des frais” in French, “Kostenfestsetzung in German, see R. 150.1 RoP).” Comment 1. Congratulations if you can read this decision without getting a headache. 2. Clearly, we have created a monster, wasting clients’ money and judges’ precious time. 3. Why can costs not have a simple system! Let’s see if there are national systems that deal with costs in a more efficient way! 4. I must admit: I have a headache but apparently I still do not understand it completely. I understand that you normally file your costs in PI proceedings after the case on te merit. However, if no such proceedings are filed defendant can start cost proceedings within a month after the service of the PI decision. If then later the claimant nevertheless starts a case on the merit, defendant can continue with the cost proceedings and if he has not started cost proceedings he can do so after the case on the merit. However, in consideration 24 the Court states that in that case defendant can also still file within one month after the PI order and these principles apply in appeal mutatis mutandis. However, when in appeal Yealink filed within one month after the decision in the PI proceedings after the case on the merit by Barco was started, Yealink’s application was not admissible (because it has to wait until the decision on the merit). Is there a contradiction? There is no such contradiction if in fact Yealink would have not filed within one month after the PI decision in appeal but the Court states it had filed within one month (which is only so if you read R. 360 RoP (b) into (c)) all assuming service of the PI decision on appeal took place on 28 November 2025). 5. On a simple point the JR does not make a decision! I would say. If you do not bother to file cost proceedings you should of course still be able, if the other side asks for costs, to invoke compensation with costs which have been awarded to you. That is only fair then asking for money but not wanting to pay what you owe because of a formality.

Key Holdings

  • Leave to appeal against a cost decision under Rule 221 RoP shall be granted if the decision is manifestly erroneous or raises a fundamental question of law, requiring the applicant invoking manifest error to show that without the error the outcome would likely have been different.
  • Rule 221 RoP does not strictly require separate submissions; an applicant may combine an application for leave to appeal, a Statement of Appeal, and a Statement of Grounds of Appeal into a single document.
  • When applying point II.5(b) of the Guidelines for recoverable costs by analogy to preliminary injunction proceedings, the 66% reduction applies to the value in dispute of the proceedings rather than directly reducing the ceiling of recoverable costs.
  • Cost proceedings under Rule 150 RoP et seq. relate solely to cost determination (which costs and what amounts are recoverable) and do not allow re-examination of the underlying cost allocation made under Article 69 UPCA.

Tags

  • Costs
  • Leave to appeal
  • Rule 221 RoP
  • Value in dispute
  • Recoverable costs

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