UPC_CFI_935/2025 – InterDigital v Amazon

Court: Local Division Mannheim
Date: 2025-12-22
Outcome: Granted
Sector: Electronics/SEP
Decision Type: PROCEDURAL

Expert Commentary

22 December 2025 (late published) Local Division Mannheim, InterDigital v Amazon UPC_CFI_935/2025 Antisuit injunction Facts 1. Amazon starts proceedings in the UK requesting the UK Court to set the RAND (reasonable and non-discriminating) license rate to be paid by Amazon for a license under InterDigital’s essential patents. It further mentioned the right to, but did not request a so called “interim license”. 2. Amazon bases its request on a RAND declaration by InterDigital governed by Swiss law under which InterDigital has the obligation to license implementers under certain standard essential patents. 3. InterDigital asks the Court in Mannheim for an ex parte injunction basically forbidding Amazon to ask/enforce for an interim license in the UK arguing that such decision would violate its right to pursue patent infringement proceedings in the UPC (“anti interim license injunction”). 4. The Mannheim court grants the requested ex parte measures. 5. Amazon asks for review of the PI order. The Court 1. The relief requested in the UK is in fact an anti-suit injunction because it hinders InterDigital to enforce their patents in a foreign jurisdiction including in the UPC, as Amazon can raise a license defense in such proceedings. 2. According to the Court, this would violate the “ordre public” of the European Union and it violates the fundamental right of the patentee to enforce its patents. 3. The Court discusses modifications that were made to the anti-anti-suit order granted by the UK in the meantime, but finds that said UK order remains silent about the effects of the final relief sought in the UK proceedings. 4. The Local Division stipulates the amount of fines in case of a violation to up to € 50 million, which can be increased with € 500.000 per day. Comment 1. InterDigital (two US companies and two French entities) requested the Local Division Mannheim to issue an ex parte order against Amazon (two US companies, a UK company and two Luxembourg entities). InterDigital used the German language in their application and the Local Division Mannheim granted the ex parte order in German. 2. I notice that (I assume) the international jurisdiction of the UPC is based on Art. 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (an unlawful act by Amazon because it was allegedly preventing InterDigital to enforce their UPC patents) and that there is internal competence for all Local Divisions, including the Local Division (as Luxembourg has no Local Division and also because some defendants were established outside the UPC). However, InterDigital (a non-German company) chose the Local Division Mannheim and the German language. 3. As soon as Amazon became aware of the ex parte order it asked and obtained a change of language and filed an application for review. 4. The application for a PI by InterDigital was aimed to prevent Amazon to benefit from a so called interim license of the UK courts. InterDigital argued that the interim license would prevent it to start infringement proceedings in the UPC. 5. After the grant of the ex parte order, the UK Court issued an anti-anti-suit order and made clear that its effects were restricted to the UK and did not prevent InterDigital from pursuing infringement proceedings in the UPC. 6. In the above decision in the review proceedings (called Final Order – a term unknown in the RoP and somewhat misleading because the order is not final in that an appeal is possible), the Division states that their ex parte order was also applicable to the main rate-setting proceedings in the UK. 7. You have to read the original order which is in German to judge if that is correct. I just notice that there is no mentioning of the rate-setting main proceedings. The order mentions anti-suit injunctions or similar (“gleichwertige”) proceedings such as a “Temporary Restraining Order”, which is a term used in the US which is as the word says a “temporary measure” and certainly not final rate-setting proceedings. The Division cites then as example the interim license proceedings but not at all the main (rate-setting) proceedings. 8. I have also serious doubts about the “ordre public” and TRIPS arguments of the Mannheim Division. 9. It becomes clear from the decision that InterDigital and Amazon have entered an agreement governed by Swiss law under which InterDigital has agreed to license Amazon worldwide under its essential patents for certain standards. 10. Apparently parties do not agree on the rate, which according to the agreement should be RAND. 11. I also understand that there is no jurisdiction clause in the agreement. 12. Amazon started proceedings and went to the UK courts to ask for performance under the agreement, in other words to rule on what rates Interdigital has to license. 13. UK international private law determines apparently that the UK courts are competent. As the agreement has also be performed in the UK (because of UK patents) it is not so strange if the UK law would consider the UK court competent. The same would be true for the UPC (and EU national courts) under Art. 7 of the Brussels I bis Regulation. I understand that InterDigital in the UK challenges the jurisdiction of the UK Court but lost that challenge in first instance. 14. The UK Court was the first court which was asked to adjudicate and has to apply Swiss law. 15. Both the EU and TRIPS accept that a license under a patent means that a patentee may raise a license defense as long as the licensee performs under the license. 16. So it seems difficult to see that as such a determination of the RAND license rate would in a case where the patentee has agreed to license on RAND conditions be against the “ordre public” or TRIPS. 17. This may of course be different if the outcome of such rate-setting would not be the result of proceedings in accordance with the fundamental rights (Art. 6 ECHR) or the result would be manifestly erroneous and indeed violate the “ordre public” because of the violation of the fundamental right to property (Art. 17(2) of the EU Charter). 18. As parties have entered an agreement I do not think that, as long as that agreement does not violate the EU competition law, the decision of the Court of Justice in Huawei v ZTE is important or relevant. 19. That decision would have been governing the situation in the EU if InterDigital would not have agreed to license and their patents would still read on a standard. 20. Parties conclude a worldwide agreement without a jurisdiction clause. The Mannheim court issued drastic penalty payments if a party asks a foreign court in civilized proceedings to interpret and enforce this worldwide agreement (as it is the first competent court having been asked to enforce the agreement) on the one hand but issues injunctions covering the UK because infringement of the UK patents on the other hand. 21. There seems to be somewhat of a contradiction. On the one hand the Mannheim Division (the UPC in first instance) does not like that a worldwide agreement interpreted by a competent UK court affects the rights under UPC patents while on the other hand it interprets UK patents and grants injunctions under such patents. 22. Moreover I find it also questionable that a court (here the Mannheim Division of the UPC) makes it impossible for a party to use its right to litigate in a foreign court. In the case at hand, Amazon could be punished with draconic fines by just taking the normal procedural steps in the main proceedings in the UK. 23. I cannot see any urgency or necessity for the UPC taking such drastic steps, which are also from the point of comity not desirable, in my opinion. 24. Not urgent and not necessary follows from the following: nothing prevents InterDigital to start (and apparently in the meantime they have done so) infringement proceedings under their UPC patents. If Amazon would raise as a defence the fact that they operate under a(n intermediate) license, Interdigital can argue that the grant (and the invoking) of such license respectively the license itself should not have any effect as far as the UPC patents is concerned because of a violation of the “ordre public” in the EU. I read nothing in the UK decision which would want to interfere with a decision of the UPC about the “ordre public” in the EU. Note: this case is handled for one of the parties by colleagues of my firm. I remind the reader, as with all Unfiltereds, that the above is my personal opinion and that opinion may not be shared by my firm or my colleagues.

Full Decision Text

1 Local Division Mannheim UPC_CFI_936/2025 Final Order of the Court of First Instance of the Unified Patent Court issued on 22 December 2025 Applicants: 1. InterDigital VC Holdings, Inc., 200 Bellevue Parkway, Suite 300, Wilmington, Delaware 19809, USA, represented by the CEO, 2. InterDigital Patent Holdings, Inc., 200 Bellevue Parkway, Suite 300, Wilmington, Delaware 19809, USA, represented by the CEO, 3. InterDigital Madison Patent Holdings, SAS, 20 rue Rouget de Lisle, 92130 Issy-les-Moulineaux, France, represented by Richard J. Brezski, 4. Interdigital CE Patent Holdings SAS, 20 rue Rouget de Lisle, 92130 Issy-lesMoulineaux, France, represented by Richard J. Brezski, all Applicants represented by Cordula Schumacher of ARNOLD RUESS Rechtsanwälte, Düsseldorf Address for Service on the Applicants: IDG-AMZ@arnold-ruess.com 2 Respondents: 5.1. Amazon.com, Inc., 410 Terry Avenue North Seattle, Washington, 98109, USA, represented by the CEO, represented for service by its agent Corporation Service Company, 251 Little Falls Drive, Wilmington, DE 19808, USA 2. Amazon Digital UK Limited, 1 Principal Place, Worship Street, London, EC2A 2FA, UK, represented by the CEO, 3. Amazon Europe Core S.à.r.l. (Société à responsabilité limitée), 38 Avenue John F. Kennedy, L-1855 Luxemburg, represented by the CEO, 4. Amazon EU S.à.r.l. (Société à responsabilité limitée), 38 Avenue John F. Kennedy, L1855 Luxemburg, represented by the CEO 5. Amazon Technologies, Inc., 410 Terry Avenue North Seattle, Washington 98109, USA, represented by the CEO, represented for service by its agent CSC – Lawyers Incorporating Service, 2710 Gateway Oaks Drive, Sacramento, CA 95833, USA, All Respondents represented by Klaus Haft of HOYNG ROKH MONEGIER, Munich Address for Service on the Respondents: klaus.haft@hoyngrokh.com EUROPEAN PATENTS AT ISSUE: cf. Exhibit AR10, esp. EP2548372 (UPC_CFI_1481/2025), EP3240285 (UPC_CFI_1482/2025) PANEL/DIVISION: Panel of the Local Division Mannheim of the Court of First Instance of the Unified Patent Court DECIDING JUDGES: This order is issued by the Presiding Judge and Judge Rapporteur Tochtermann, the legally qualified judge Böttcher and the legally qualified judge Kupecz. 3 LANGUAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS: German, after change of the language of the proceedings: English HEARING DATE: 14 November 2025 SUBJECT: R. 206 RoP – preliminary measures, here: application for review R. 212.3, 197.3 RoP STATEMENT OF FACTS 1. On 30 September 2025 the Panel issued an ex-parte order upon application of Applicants in the German language (then the language of the proceedings), which was served on Respondents on 2 October 2025 at the address of Respondent 4 in Munich. The operative part of the Order reads as follows: I. Den Antragsgegnerinnen wird im Wege der einstweiligen Maßnahme untersagt, ein Verfahren auf Erlass einer Anti-Suit-Injunction einzuleiten und/oder weiter zu verfolgen oder eine andere gleichwertige gerichtliche oder behördliche Maßnahme wie eine Temporary Restraining Order zu beantragen, aufgrund derer die Antragstellerinnen effektiv daran gehindert werden und/oder werden sollen, Patentverletzungsverfahren aus ihren der Zuständigkeit des EPG unterliegenden Europäischen Patenten vor dem EPG im Geltungsbereich des EPGÜ zu betreiben oder fortzusetzen, und/oder daraus resultierende Urteile oder Maßnahmen zu vollstrecken, II. wobei diese Unterlassungsverpflichtung, betreffend Patentverletzungsverfahren aus der Zuständigkeit des EPG unterliegenden Europäischen Patenten vor dem EPG im Geltungsbereich des EPGÜ, insbesondere auch umfasst 1. beim UK High Court keine vorläufige Anordnung zu beantragen, die den Antragstellerinnen aufgibt, den Antragsgegnerinnen eine Interimslizenz an Patenten der Antragstellerinnen, zu gewähren; 4 2. beim UK High Court keine vorläufige Anordnung zu beantragen, festzustellen, dass die Antragstellerinnen gegen RAND-Verpflichtungen verstoßen, wenn sie den Antragsgegnerinnen keine Interimslizenz an Patenten der Antragstellerinnen, zu den von dem UK High Court festgelegten Konditionen gewähren würde; 3. das Gebot, etwaige Anträge nach Ziff. 1. und 2. zurückzunehmen oder andere prozessuale Mittel zu ergreifen, um sie mit Wirkung für den Geltungsbereich des EPGÜ endgültig zu widerrufen; 4. das sofortige Verbot, ein etwaiges Interimslizenz-Verfahren mit Wirkung für den Geltungsbereich des EPGÜ außer zum Zweck der Antragsrücknahme weiter zu betreiben; 5. das Verbot, den Antragstellerinnen durch eine gerichtliche oder behördliche Anordnung gerichtet auf Untersagung des vorliegenden Verfahrens verbieten zu lassen, Patentverletzungsverfahren aus ihren Patenten vor den zuständigen Kammern des EPG zu führen und/oder daraus resultierende Urteil zu vollstrecken; wobei die vorstehenden Ge- und Verbote auch umfassen, auf konzernverbundene Gesellschaften unter Ausschöpfung konzernrechtlicher Möglichkeiten entsprechend einzuwirken. III. Im Falle jeder Zuwiderhandlung gegen die Anordnung nach Ziffer I. haben die Antragsgegnerinnen an das Gericht jeweils ein (ggf. wiederholtes) Zwangsgeld in Höhe von bis zu 250.000,00 € für jeden Tag der Zuwiderhandlung zu zahlen. IV. Die Anordnung ist zunächst ohne Sicherheitsleistung vollstreckbar. Die Vollstreckbarkeit endet jedoch, wenn die Antragstellerinnen zugunsten der Antragsgegner nicht innerhalb von 20 Tagen eine Sicherheit in Form einer Hinterlegung oder Bankbürgschaft in Höhe von 400.000 € geleistet haben. V. Die angeordneten einstweiligen Maßnahmen werden auf Antrag der Antragsgegnerinnen, unbeschadet etwaiger Schadenersatzforderungen, aufgehoben oder auf andere Weise außer Kraft gesetzt werden, wenn die Antragstellerinnen nicht innerhalb einer Frist von 31 Kalendertagen oder 20 Werktagen – je nachdem, welcher Zeitraum länger ist – ab dem Tag des Erlasses der vorliegenden Anordnung gerechnet beim Einheitlichen Patentgericht das Verfahren in der Hauptsache einleiten. V. Im Übrigen wird der Antrag zurückgewiesen. 5 VI. Die Antragsgegnerinnen tragen die Kosten des Verfahrens. VII. Der Streitwert wird auf 2 Millionen € festgesetzt. 2. After the language of the proceedings was changed to English by order of 17 October 2025, Respondents requested as follows (by way of application of 14 October 2025 without grounds, which were only submitted later in the brief of 3 November 2025): I. The order of the Local Division Mannheim of the Court of first instance of the UPC dated 30 September 2025 is revoked. II. The application is dismissed. III. The Applicants bear the costs of the proceedings. 3. For the grounds of the ex-parte Order it is referred to the Order of 30 September 2025 so as to avoid repetition. Respondents‘ arguments 4. Respondents argue, the impugned Order was an anti-suit injunction directed against Respondents so as to block them pursuing their contractual claims before the UK courts. The contractual claims resulted from a RAND declaration of the Applicants vis-à-vis the International Telecommunications Union - Telecommunications Standardization Sector (“ITU-T”) in Switzerland, which they had made voluntarily. An exemplary declaration is displayed below: 5. By granting the Order against a contractual claim, the Panel had „fatally undermined the system of contractual declarations made to SSOs such as ETSI, the ITU-T and the IEEE“. The implementer would not be able to get the promised licence but could „only rely on competition law as a defence to infringement claims“, which was insufficient and inappropriate in the eyes of Respondents. 6 6. It was generally acknowledged by courts in the UK, US and elsewhere, that the RAND declaration established a contract between the SEP holder and the Standard-Setting Organization (SSO). This contract involved a stipulation for the benefit of third parties, which could be relied upon by implementers as third-party beneficiaries. Under Swiss law, the third-party beneficiary obtained the right to enforce the RAND declaration by way of specific performance, and in particular, the right to obtain a licence from Applicants on RAND terms or to receive a RAND offer, which is capable of acceptance and which is enforceable under Swiss law. 7. In the opinion of Respondents the third-party beneficiary can also enforce this right to obtain such a license on an interim basis, pending determination of the final terms under the applicable Swiss law. Respondents‘ request for relief in the UK proceedings is directed at declaratory relief and specific performance. In addition, Respondents are of the opinion that they are entitled to an Interim-Licence relief, but were unduely prevented from pursuing such relief by the impugned order. Any objection of Applicants against the jurisdiction of the UK courts was misplaced. 8. In view of the impugned order, Responents requested expedited RAND rate setting proceedings and were granted expedition,so that the respective hearings on the Final relief will take place in September 2026. 9. After a Case Management Conference at the UK High Court on 9 October 2025, Amazon applied – in reaction to the impugned Order – for an order before the UK High Court aimed at protecting the Final rate-setting action in the UK. The order was granted ex-parte on 20 October 2025, accompanied by an approved judgement of the same date. Still, in his case managament conference of 9 October 2025, the same judge heavily critized UK counsel of Applicants as follows (see review application at paras. 205 et seqq.; emphasis added by Respondents in their brief), a few days before granting the aforementioned UK Order: 7 10. Respondents included – in their application for the UK ex-parte order – a clarification. The UK High Court, in the course of the private, i.e. ex-parte, hearing in advance of issuing its order (see Exhibit HRM 3, transcript pages 39 et seqq.) – advised Respondents not to include it in the final order for the reasons set out in the approved judgement of 20 October 2025 at para 42 ([2025] EWHC 2708 (Pat)) as follows: 8 11. The sealed order of the UK High Court of the same date orders as follows, containing an injunction: […] 9 and defining the „Final Relief“ in Annex A as follows: 10 11 12. The Respondents argue, the impugned order should be reviewed and the application dismissed, because the UPC case law provided an SEP owner with injunctive relief against an implementer, who does not hold a licence, without good reason. As emphasized in the oral hearing, the only correct conceptual approach on the FRAND issue was the contractual approach followed by the UK courts. This approach advocates for limiting the SEP owner‘s rights to monetization through licensing, while accepting limits on how the monopoly right may be enforced. The only proper construction of any declaration to a SSO was, that the SEP owner self-restrains its right to an injunction by entering into a volutary contractual commitment. The basis, from which the impugned order started, was therefore incorrect as the focus on (EU) antitrust law in FRAND cases was ill-founded and not to be accepted as it resulted in injunctive relief, which was unacceptable for implementers as they were forced into supra-FRAND licence agreements by the injunction granted by i.a. the UPC and the German courts. 12 13. An interim-license would not have an effect of an anti-suit injunction. An application for specific performance of an Interim-license was, instead, aimed at being allowed to use the patentee’s SEPs on an interim basis in return for the payment of a provisional license fee to be adjusted following the final RAND determination. If the UK court would find for specific performance,serious consequences could follow in case of disobedience with such finding, but those consequences would be „within the typical mechanisms of enforcement. If the addressee of an order for specific performance disobeys the order, it may be held to be in contempt of court and punished by a fine, imprisonment, confiscation of assets or other punishment under the law.“ (review application para. 112). 14. The consequences of such order were owed to the fact, that it merely implemented the limitations, that Applicants had imposed on themselves through the license declaration. All de facto-effects of the UK orders had to be accepted as mere „spill-over effects […] inherent in multi-jurisdictional disputes“. A decision in a country may – in the opinion of Respondents – automatically influence the international litigation elsewhere and it could not be accused of anticipating or preventing decisions in other countries or of being imperialistic based on this alone. 15. Finally, the idea of the UK courts to impose interim regimes on SEP owners was already embedded in the ECJ’s Huawei decision. The interim licence was to be equated with the security mentioned in that decision as explained in the most recent judgement of the UK Court of Appeals of 31 October 2025 in Samsung v ZTE per Birss LJ ([2025] EWCA Civ 1383). 16. Furthermore, the UPC had no competence to protect fundamental rights as enshrined in the EU Charter or the European Convention on Human Rightes, which the Court took as a basis for its order. The reason was, that such competence was not mentioned in Art. 32 UPCA. 13 Applicants‘ arguments 17. Applicants, in their response to the grounds for review of 10 November 2025, request that the Order remains in effect. 18. Applicants clarify, they do not ask the Court to extend the relief so as to prevent Respondents from conducting the main UK rate-setting trial. 19. Applicants emphasize, that it were Respondents, who had left the negotiation table and initiated rate-setting proceedings in the UK and filed actions against 18 patents in Brazil including an ASI. The impugned Order of the UPC, therefore, was a purely defensive mechansim, which was not intended to prevent Respondents from conducting the main UK FRAND-rate-setting. However, Respondents‘ announced application for an interim licence, which they already included in the briefs concerning the Final rate-setting, the expedition application in the UK and the application for a further ex parte AAASI had only one goal – to block Applicants asserting patent rights anywhere else than in the UK in order to force them to submit to the UK proceedings. 20. As far as Respondents referred to contractual claims, this line of argument was ill-founded, since the portfolio of Appplicants, undisputedly, contained thousands of non-standard essential patents. Even the vast majority of Interdigital’s Video Portfolio was unrelated and not subject to the ITU-T RAND obligation. This obligation anyways only established an obligation to negotiate in good faith not a duty to conclude a contract. 21. Especially, there was no obligation whatsoever under Swiss law to enforce such a licence on an interim basis. Rather Respondents tried to abuse the possibilities developped by the UK courts to obtain interim-licence declarations and to combine this with the alleged Swiss contractual claim. 22. The UK courts, in addition, were asked by Respondents to force Applicants into an interimlicence covering non-standard essential patents as well. 23. Furthermore, the forum choice of Respondents exclusively aimed at litigating in the UK to enforce low FRAND rates, even though the dispute relates to two US companies in disagreement over alleged Swiss law claims. No jurisdiction of UK courts could be accepted 14 to exclusively adjudicate in such a scenario. In fact, only 3-4% of its patent claims essential to the standards were UK patents. 24. Moreover, Respondents accompanied their expedition application before the UK High Court, which also solely aimed at the UK courts coming first before any injunctive relief could be issued by a European court, by a further appplication so as to block any ASI of the UPC without their being any such risk established. In the hearing, the UK judge challenged Applicants to „just agree“ not to enforce any injunctions until January 2027 so that an expedition would not be needed, because until then, the main trial would be completed without expedition. In essence, Respondents argued and the UK High Court accepted, that an adjudication of an infringement claim before the UPC would potentially lead to supraFRAND terms and that Respondents needed to be protected by the UK courts against this happening. 25. Applicants challenged the UK High court‘s order of 20 October 2025. In the UK hearing on 30 and 31 October 2025, when raising the question whether, in case of the UK court ordering a licence with specific performance, Applicants would still be free to argue before the UPC that such licence would not be valid, the UK judge replied as follows, what the Applicants highlighted in their brief: 26. According to Applicants, clarification of that point was necessary. 15 27. The whole picture drawn by Respondents, that a contractual approach would lead to results, which would differ in category from what Respondents called the competition law approach, was ill-founded. Even Respondents own expert Sir Christopher Floyd confirmed, that any contractual claims would have to be interpreted in the light of the competition law situation and vice versa. 28. The request for an interim-licence was at least a de facto anti-suit injunction. The sole purpose of interim-licences was to deter the patentee from enforcing his patent rights elsewhere than in the UK. This was in line with Respondents behaviour, which tried to force Applicants waive the enforcement of its IP rights by way of an undertaking (Exhibit AR5). 29. Most importantly, the interim-licence was not needed for the UK territory. It was completely in the hands of the UK courts when to grant or not to grant injunctive relief. An interim-licence was not needed for any reason in the UK. It was exclusively directed against foreign courts so as to block them from rendering justice. 30. For further details of the written submissions it is referred to the briefs and exhibits. Further procedure 31. On 14 November 2025 the case was heard before the Panel. The parties agreed, that the Panel should not issue an order immediately but wait for the outcome of the UK proceedings first, in which Applicants challenged the UK order of 20 October 2025. Respondent suggested, that points of interest to these proceedings, may be clarified in the course of the UK proceedings. The parties agreed to the court’s proposal, that both sides should report on the UK proceeding until 9 December 2025 (this time limit was extended later by further order) and waived their right to a further hearing upon those submissions. The Panel reserved its right to call the parties to a further hearing in case deemed necessary. By way of communciation on the CMS, the court communicated – after the parties‘ brief were received – that no further hearing was foreseen and that an order was to be issued any time soon. 16 32. Appellants, meanwhile, filed two Infringement actions, which both are based on nonstandard-essentials Patents, with the Local Division Mannheim on 7 November 2025, EP2548372 (UPC_CFI_1481/2025), EP3240285 (UPC_CFI_1482/2025). Service was accepted by Respondents‘ counsel at the beginning of the hearing before the Panel on 14 November 2025. 33. On 2 December 2025 the UK High Court issued an order upholding its Order issued on 20 October 2025 and continued through further Order of 30 October 2025 under certain modifications, which Respondents highlight as follows: 17 GROUNDS FOR THE ORDER 34. The Order is confirmed and remains in force as issued. The main reasons are summarized hereinafter in paras 35 – 40: UK interim-licences equate to an anti-suit injunction 35. The measures addressed as „interim licence“ or „adjustable licence“ - referred to in the operative part of the Order of 30 September 2025 under item II. as vorläufige Anordnung or Interimslizenz (only the German language as original language of the proceeding being authoritative) – are an anti-suit injunction exclusively directed against the Applicants enforcing their IP rights in foreign jurisdictions and therefore also before the UPC (see paras. 41 et seqq). 36. There is no justifiable ground for such an order, which is directed against a party turning to a foreign court to have it assess that party‘s patent rights. Such order is especially not needed to safeguard the UK proceedings. Even though such an „interim-licence“ or „adjustable licence“ violates the ordre public of the European Union and therefore also the ordre public of the UPC contracting member states, which renders it null and void and thus unenforceable in UPC contracting member states, Applicants have a legal interest in defending against such an order imposed upon them. UK Final FRAND-rate setting is a measure equivalent to an ASI in the sense of the Impugned Order, should it encroach upon a party’s fundamental right to enforce its patent rights before the UPC 37. The Order is furthermore upheld as granted in operative part I. of the Order of 30 September 2025, which relates to Anti-suit injunctions and any „andere gleichwertige gerichtliche oder behördliche Maßnahme“ (only the German language as original language of the proceeding being authoritative). 38. For reason of clarity, it is emphasized, that the Order of 30 September 2025, which is not extended in its scope by this order, but only confimed in the scope as it was, relates to any measure equivalent to an ASI irrespective of its denomination and irrespective of it being described as an „interim“ or a „final“ relief. It encompasses all measures by a court or a 18 public authority, which directly or indirectly or due to a de facto-effect prevent the Appellants from pursuing their Patent rights before the UPC and from seeking access to justice before the UPC as a court common to the member states and a court bound by EU law (Art. 1 and 20 UPCA). Accordingly, it encompasses also to the „Final relief“ as defined in Annex A of the UK High Court’s order, in case the Final relief, as soon as it has been granted, prevents the Appellants‘ right to argue their case and seek to enforce their Patent rights before the UPC. Modified UK High Court order 39. Whereas the Court has seen the modifications of the Order of the UK High Court of 20 October 2025 in the Order of 2 December 2025 in sofar as it limits the effects of that order as such, it remains silent upon the effects of the Final relief. In consequence, it has to remain open for the time being whether the UK Order of 20 October 2025 as continued and modified, violates this court’s Order of 30 September 2025 and warrants severe consequences. As such danger is imminent the Order had to be upheld. This Order, however, is not limiting the UK courts to attach whatever legal consequences to such order, judgment or other decision as long as such effects are strictly limited to the UK territory and do not attach any negative consequences whatsoever to the Applicants for enforcing their patent rights in relation to the UPCA contracting member states. The same holds true for any other foreign court as long as its order, judgement or other decision does not interfere with access to the UPC. Enforceability and Warning 40. According to the jurisprudence of the UPC Court of Appeal (Order of 14 October 2025, UPC CoA 699/2025 – FUJI/Kodak), this order had to include a clear warning. Therefore, the possible coercive measures in case of a breach of this order had to be detailed in the order. As a breach of this order will materialize, if Appellants are blocked from pursuing any of their Patents, for which the UPC has competence, in any of the UPC contracting member states, the penalties ordered had to be suffciently high so as to deter Respondents from breaching this Order. 19 UK interim-licences and/or adjustable licences 41. The Order of 30 September 2025 is to be confirmed as it relates, under item II., to a vorläufige Anordnung or Interimslizenz (only the German language as original language of the proceeding being authoritative). 42. The legal concept of the interim-licence or adjustable licence, as used by Respondents to advance their interests, aims attargetting foreign jurisdictions (see e.g. the argument of Respondents before the UK High Court p. 30 et seq. 30 October 2025 hearing = Exhibit HRM 8, highlighting added): 20 43. Thus, the patent owner is not only facing a contract defence in the UK. The objective of the interim-licence granted by the UK courts explicitly is to provide the implementer with a defence in other jurisdictions to avoid injunctions being granted elsewhere. This is procedural behaviour of Respondents is abusive and inappropriate for the following reasons: 44. The concept of the interim-licence is not needed so as to protect the UK proceedings at all. The UK proceedings are in the hands of the UK courts. Therefore, there is no justifiable interest of a party to the UK proceedings to be protected on UK territory against its own courts. They are the master of their proceedings. If, under UK law, a standard-essential patent is regarded as a patent devoid of injunctive relief and therefore as a different 21 category of patent, that is fully acceptable and solely a matter for the UK courts to decide, as long as such assessment is confined to the territory of the UK. 45. It is, however, excessive produral tactic of Respondents and against comity and the acquis communtaire of the European Union and the UPC contracting member states to impose such a concept upon foreign territories by way of a relief, which solely aims at depriving Applicants of pursuing their fundamental (intellectual) property rights and seeking access to justice before a EU court. Therefore, Applicants are entitled to an Order, which protects these fundamental rights. 46. Contrary to Respondents‘ statements, the interim-licence as developed in the jurisprudence of the UK courts – it is referred to the Order of 30 October 2025, which sets out the case law in detail, to avoid repetition – and used by Respondents does have and is intended to have a deterrent effect on SEP owners to pursue their patent rights before the UPC. The interim-licence is not – as submittted by Respondents – limited to being able to raise the interim-licence as a contract defense against an infringement action. By forcing the patent owner to accept the terms of the interim-licence vis-a-vis any pending infringement action before the UPC, the patent owner is not only facing a contract defence in the UK proceeding, where it is not needed anyway. The objective of the interim-licence explicitly is to provide the implementer with a contract defence in other jurisdictions, even though the interim-licence is not a full contract. The UK courts only set an interim-licence rate to be payed at the rate half-way between the implementer’s and the patent owner’s last offer without any detailed determination of the factual and legal situation (see expert opinion of Respondents by Sir Christopher Floyd in Exhibit HRM 11 at para. 45, further see as one example UK CoA Panasonic vs. Xiaomi [2024] EWCA Civ 1143 at para. 100: “Secondly, the sum payable by way of royalty in respect of that period should be midway between (i) the sum offered by Xiaomi for that period and (ii) the proportion of the sum demanded by Panasonic […]“). Therefore, the interim-licence is considered to serve as a contract defense in foreign courts, even though the essential elements of such "contract" remain completely in the open. Rather, the licence rate is subject to changes in the course of the final rate setting and even a further proceeding upon appeal. 47. Against the background of the present dispute, offering such a „contract“ defense is even less arguable, since the defense would not only relate to patents owned by the Applicants, 22 which undisputedly are SEPs, but it would also encompass patents, which undisputedly are non-standard-essential patents. Respondents are not able to convincingly argue, why the interim-licence should also encompass such non-SEPs. As far as counsel of Respondents pointed to the non-SEPs being de facto essential patents, Respondents did not develop any argument, why the framework as discussed for SEPs under the caselaw of the ECJ should be equally applicable to non-SEPs, let alone why the ITU-T declaration invoked before the UK courts would encompass such de facto essential patents. 48. Such application appears difficult to argue, even if the Panel in lieu of Respondents tried to make such a legal argument: The whole reasoning of the ECJ in Huawei vs ZTE (judgement of 16 July 2025 – C-170/13) is based on the specific situation of a technical environment, for which standards were set through SSOs to which companies make their contributions, which later are protected as a standard-essential patent. Why this reasoning should be equally true for a non-standard-essential patent, which is as powerful as it is as an IP right, because the invention protected by it was so good, that it became a generally accepted solution to the specific technical problem, instead of being a patent, which is powerful, because itssolution was implemented into an industry standard is far from self-explanatory and not settled case law. 49. Against this background, it appears not to be defendable to set a provisonal rate, encompassing all patents, be they SEPs or non-SEPs, not examine the offer and counteroffer and find that a patent owner still is obliged to accept the preliminary amount set halfway. All this, according to the UK case law is to be accepted by the patent owner to appear reasonable in the eyes of the UK courts, even though that amount is commercially of no use, since it is only received on a preliminary basis, so that it cannot be used as assets to be re-invested or to do any other commercially useful business. In the view of the Panel, it is not in line with the applicable EU law, especially the case law of the ECJ in Huawei/ZTE, that this is what a reasonable patent owner will have to accept in order to be a willing licensor. Again, the UK courts have any liberty to decide differently for the UK territory. 50. If this – what Respondents describe as an unavoidable „spill-over effect“ resulting from Applicants‘ contractual obligations – was accepted, the interim-licence would put an undue burden upon Applicants to defend against such „contractual“ defence in the foreign forum. Not only would the Applicants be forced to invest considerable sums for their legal advisors 23 before the UPC and in the UK to fend off the argument for no justifiable reason, but they would additionally see themselves forced to submit to such interim-licence for reasons of compliance as they will not want to draw a picture before any court to be a company, which does not comply with court orders and decisions but negates them. 51. Even if the Applicants would be prepared to take that risk, they are still put in a position, where they would have to defend themselves against an argument, which is null and void as it runs counter to the ordre public of the EU and the UPC contracting member states. There is no justifiable reason, why this should be accepted. It is not for any court of one territory to protect a certain interest group against another interest group, when these interests colide on a different territory than the own territory. What Respondents call a „spill-over effect“ is actually a far-reaching intrusion into the legal order of a different territory, which violates comity. An interim-licence aims at imposing an undue burden upon patent owners to enforce their patent rights regarding non-UK territory. In particular, not respecting such an interim-licence with regard to non-UK territory would not be a reasonable option for a patent owner, as it would amount to not being compliant to court orders and giving the impression of doing wrong, even though such a court order is not recognizable and enforceable at least in the European Union for the reasons detailed infra. Even a mere declaratory relief, that patent owners are obliged to grant an interim-licence or are to be considered as unwilling patent owners violating their supposed obligations, if they do not grant an interim licence, has the same unacceptable effects. It is a fundamental principle of international civil procedure, that decisions of a court of one country, in the absence of any bilateral or multilateral international treaties, are only enforeable in another country, after such decision has been recognized and found enforceable by the courts of the territory concerned. This is also true for scenarios, where the parties voluntarily excluded state courts by submitting to arbitration, as arbitral awards also have to be recognised and declared enforceable by a state court so as to guarantee that the fundamental principles of law of that country, which are part of its ordre public, are respected (see Art. 5 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 – New York Convention). 24 UK interim-licence violates EU ordre public 52. As detailed hereinafter, the concept of an interim-licence granted by a non-EU court violates the ordre public of the European Union and the UPC contracting member states: 53. It is settled case law of the European Court of Justice, that the fundamental rights of the EU as enshrined in the EU Charta of fundamental rights (ECJ, judgement of 4 October 2024 – C-633/22 – Real Madrid Club de Fútbol) as well as the EU antitrust law (ECJ C-126/97 – eco swiss, ECJ C-124/21 para 192/193 International Skating Union and ECJ C-600/23 Royal Football Club Seraing vs FIFA para 88) are part of the ordre public of the EU. 54. A measure with the effects as described, imposed upon a patent proprietor would not only violate its fundamental property rights as protected by Art. 17(2) and 47(1) of the EU Charta, but also the basic principles of EU antitrust law as encompassed by Art 101, 102 TFEU. 55. Furthermore, such measure appears to be in conflict with the TRIPS agreement as described in the Request for Consultations WT/DS632/1 of 22 January 2025 by the EU Permanent Mission to the WTO. It reasons that a measure setting, without the consent of both parties, conditions for worldwide licences for SEPs to curtail the ability of SEP owners to enforce their rights and to ensure the respect of obligations with respect to foreign SEPs in the courts of the jurisdictions, where the foreign patents were granted, and curtailing the ability of the courts of these jurisdictionsto adjudicate actions relating to those patents in the respective jurisdictions, as being in breach of the TRIPS agreement. 56. A further violation of the TRIPS agreement, which equally raises fundamental concerns, was identified by the EU authorities where the courts of a state grant anti-suit relief in order to hinder parties pursuing their intellectual property rights in other jurisdictions as this could result in forcing the SEP owner to accept global infra-FRAND rates (WT/DS611/1 and WT/DS611/ARB25 of 21 July 2025). 57. If this a reason for concern in scenarios, where undisputedly only SEPs are affected, the concern is all the higher, where such measure also encompasses non-SEPs. 25 58. An additional concern follows from the fact, that the interim-licence is available to any implementer in the UK irrespective of its past behaviour (see UK CoA Samsung vs ZTE [2025 EWCA Civ 1383 at para.4: „An implementer which has undertaken to the Patents Court to take a licence on the terms determined by the Patents Court to be FRAND (subject to adjustment on appeal) is by definition a willing licensee. […] The implementer therefore cannot be accused of holding out even if it had previously been holding out. “). 59. According to that case law, every implementer, who has given an undertaking to UK courts to have them determine a (F)RAND rate, is considered to be a willing licencee and entitled to an interim-licence, no matter how the implementer behaved in the past and for how long he deprived the SEP owner of a licence fee. 60. As the case law cited in the Panel‘s Order of 30 September 2025 and the Orders, appproved judgements and transcripts of the hearings before the UK High court show beyond any reasonable doubt, the sole motivation of any party applying for an UK interim-licence is to ensure that no other court, including the UPC, may grant an injunction before the UK court setsthe final rate. The justification of Respondents isthat such injunction would force them to accept supra-FRAND terms. This assumption is, however, incorrect and misrepresenting the case law of the UPC. It was clearly developed in the Panasonic vs Oppo decision of the Local Division Mannheim (decision of 22 November 2024 UPC_CFI_210/2023 at paras 198 et seqq.), and accepted later by the LD Munich in Huawei vs Netgear (UPC_CFI_9/2023, p. 132 et seqq.), that the offer of the SEP owner – as far as it relates to SEPs – is examined and that a SEP owner will not be granted an injunction, if his offer was not complying with FRAND-requirements Therefore, there is no risk, that an injunction is granted, if the offer of the SEP holder is excessive. If that risk is absent, the court will either only determine damages or – upon application – set a licence rate in the proceeding. As such a rate will be a global rate, as generally accepted by business parties, it will have to be accepted that any different court, which finds itself to be competent, may set different rates. It is not for a court of another jurisdiction to decide, whether or not a patent can serve as a basis for injunctive relief or not. It is clearly stated in the ECJs judgement Huaweri vs ZTE (cited supra) as developed in the Order of 30 September 2025, that also SEPs can serve as a basis for an injunction and are not deprived of such legal effect. Again, the courts of the UK may reason otherwise with effect limited to their territory. 26 61. It is to be noted, that the argument developed by LJ Birss at para. 84 of his opinion in the case Samsung vs ZTE ([2025] EWCA Civ 1383), that the concept of the UK interim-licence was already inherent in the ECJ’s decision in Huawei vs ZTE cannot be supported. A security as discussed in the ECJ‘s judgement and a coerced one-sided up-front payment aiming to block a patent owner from pursuing its property rights in a competent foreign court cannot be equated. 62. Respondents can also not be followed with the line of arguments, which they call the contractual approach: 63. It is their own expert, Sir Christopher Floyd, retired UK CoA judge, who – in contradiction to Respondents – accepts at para. 31 (Exhibit HRM 11) that it is: „incorrect to regard the identification of the correct legal framework for determining the (F)RAND issue as a binary choice between competiton law and contract law. It is competition law which underlies the requirement imposed by standard-setting organisations to require the (F)RAND commitment. It provides relevant context for interpretation of the commitment.“ 64. This view is in line with this court‘s reasoning. The declaration made by a SEP owner cannot be taken out of the context of antitrust law, which requires the SEP owner (in the EU according to Art. 101 TFEU) to make a (F)RAND declaration. 65. That the context of the contractual declaration also is relevant under the applicable Swiss law is again accepted by Respondents own expert on Swiss law at paras. 61 et seqq. Of his expert opinion (Exhibit HRM 05 – JDW-2). Moreover, there is no indication that Swiss law provides for an interim-licence, an instrument that, as discussed supra, is exclusively developed for blocking non-UK patent infringement proceedings, in which a licence defence based on anti-trust and Swiss contractural law, if raised, will be assessed anyway. 27 66. For these grounds, any interim-licence set by a UK court according to the developed case law so far upon motion of a party is counter to ordre public and thus not enforceable in the UPC contracting member states. 67. For the reasons set out supra, the Appellants still have a legitimate interest in the Order as granted so as to protect their fundamental rights. Effects of the Final rate setting in UK 68. The same considerations are equally valid for the Order insofar as it extends in item I. to the measures described therein. The order, as of the date of its issuance, protects the Applicants against any equivalent measure irrespective of its denomination, which encroaches upon the fundamental rights described. 69. The scope of this order must have been clear beyond any reasonable doubt as the Order not only extends in its item I. to „andere gleichwertige gerichtliche oder behördliche Maßnahme“. 70. Morever, para. 56 of the grounds of the Order of 30 September 2025 reads: Der Antragsfassung stehen auch insoweit kein Bedenken entgegen, als sie sich auf gleichwertige gerichtliche oder behördliche Maßnahme erstreckt, da es insoweit nicht auf die formelle Bezeichnung der gerichtlichen oder behördlichen Anordnung als „Anti-suit-injunction“ oder „Interim Licence“ ankommt, sondern darauf, ob sie dieselbe rechtstatsächliche Wirkung hat, mag die Anordnung auch unter einer anderen Bezeichnung stehen oder in anderer prozessualer Einkleidung getroffen sein. and thus further explains the scope of item I. 71. Respondents, still, remain free to pursue the Final relief as described in Annex A of the UK High Court’s order, be it in an expedited procedure or not, given that, unlike an interim licence, the final relief will be based on in depth-scrutiny of what is (F)RAND. However, this only applies but only insofar as the effects of the Final relief are limited to the territory of 28 the UK in the sense that no negative consequences whatsoever arise for Applicants, if they choose not to accept the outcome and enforce their European patents in relation to UPCA contracting member states and argue that the outcome is not binding upon them with regard to the territories of the UPCA contracting member states. 72. The Court recognizes the modification of the initial UK High Court order. However, the carve-out only refers to any consequences arising from that order. It does not deal with the consequences of the Final relief sought. This concern was discussed in the hearing nefore the Panel but Resopondents nonetheless failed to clarify the scope of their application in the further course of the UK proceedings, even though the UK judge may have been more than prepared to do so. 73. Moreover, the sealed UK High Court order, also in its modified form, does not clarify this point, neither is this point clarified by the approved judgement of 2 December 2025. The clear wording wording oft he modified order relates, in ist item 5., to „the injunction in paragraph 4“. The injunction, however, is the UK AASI, not the Final rate-setting. 74. Additionally, both parties disagreed on the effects of the approved judgement upon the sealed order. Whereas Respondent submitted the sealed High Court Order would have to be construed by any judge in the light of the approved judgement, i.e it was binding also upon another UK High court judge, who might deal with an application to find Applicants in contempt of court and in breach of the order, Applicants argued that the judgement could only be taken into consideration but was not binding to the extent described by Respondents. In this context, it hasto be underlined, that the approved judgement and teh Order are carefully drafted and express themselves in considerable detail and define the Final relief to be protected in a very precise and elaborate way. Therefore, it is in stark contrast, that both, the order and the approved judgment remain silent on the effects of the Final rate setting decision upon the Applicant´s right before foreign courts. They only refer to possible effects of the Order itself, which is to protect the process of the final rate setting. They do not clarify, what the result of the final rate setting will be once the proceeding is concluded and results in a final and binding decision. 75. The Final relief of Annex A itself details under item (6) that the Applicants may be found to be in breach of the Final relief and liable to pay damages, if they refuse to declare or offer 29 the licence contract as determined by the UK court. It remains open, if it is considered a breach in that sense, in case the UK courts determine, that the Final licence contract has to include a jurisdiction clause, as suggested in the arguments of the UK High Court judge (see supra ta para. 25), which may then serve as a basis to grant a classical ASI as accepted by the UK courts standing case law (see UK Court of Appeal [2025] EWCA Civ 1383 at para. 71 per LJ Arnold and UK CoA [2024] EWCA Civ 1143 at para. 66 per LJ Arnold confimed by LJ Philpps at para. 105; J.P. Morgan v Weerealize.com [2205] EWHC 1842 (Comm), at para. 107; SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd [2020] EWCA Civ 599 at paras 90.-91., 103, 108 per Males LJ ) as well as in the approved judgement of Meade J of 20 October 2025 in this dispute (UK High Court 20 October 2025 [2025] EWHC 2708 (Pat) at para. 22) and this is not accepted by Applicants or at least argued against before a foreign court. That this situation is considered a breach is suggested by the UK High Court judge (see Exhibit HRM 8 Page 90 et seqq., declared to be a hypothetical example alone in the approved judgement of 2 December 2025, para 105): 30 31 32 33 76. Also the approved judgment remains silent on this point. It just addresses the situation in ist para. 96, that such foreign court decided prior to the UK court. It does not make clear what happens, if the UK court determined there is a licence contract first and thereafter this contract is put into quesition in a foreign forum. 77. This is confirmed by Exhibit page 47. Here Meade J points out: „My order isto stop your clients interfering with these proceedings, not what happens after they have finished. So I do not actually think [..] it is important to clarify I understand. I understand why the UPC want to know, but I do not really think there is much substance in this one.“ 78. It rather mentions that „deciding the parties‘ contractual rights might best be done just once“. 34 79. If damages for breach of contract would be determined, such damages would have an equally deterent effect as any coercive measure being imposed. The same is true, if Applicants were also found to be in contempt of court for the same reason. 80. That this is not an abstract risk, but an imminent one, is supported by the scope of the UK High Court order itself, which was issued after the present Order was issued upon application of Respondents, who therefore may be in breach of this court’s Order already depending on the future effects of their application. 81. That the Final reflief may have such severe consequences is furthermore confirmed by the Respondents own expert in case the UK courts accept that Respondents are entitled to specific performance as a matter of Swiss law, which Resppondents argue in the case at hand. Sir Christoper Floyd explains at para 60 (Exhibit HRM 11): „If Amazon’s contention were to succeed, the English court would be likely to grant an order that InterDigital must grant a licence on the terms which the court has concluded (including in an interim basis) are RAND. Were InterDigital to refuse to do so, then they would be in breach of the court’s order and serious consequences could follow.“ 82. That the Respondents are more than prepared to make use of any relief available by any court so as to block Appellants form pursuing their IP rights in foreign jurisdictions is demonstrated not only by their direct communication with the Appellants (see Exhibits AR 15, AR 31, AR 32), but is reinforced by the fact that Respondents – even though this was extensively discussed in the oral hearing of 14 November 2025 – did not motion to clarify and modify the UK High Court Order so as to avoid any remaining doubts, that the Final relief granted by the UK courts will not bite on the Appellants right to pursue their rights in other jurisdictions. The Panel, upon suggestion of Respondents, only refrained from handing down a review order immediately after the hearing, as Respondents requested to give time to clarify the situation before the UK High Court. It was very clear that the Panel’s concern did not relate to the scope of the UK High Court order, which aims to protect the FRAND-rate setting procedure, as Meade J also pointed out (see supra). The central concern was and still is, what the consequences of the Final relief, once granted, are. This must have been evident from the agreed protocol of the 14 November 2025 hearing, which 35 the UK High Court was furnished with by the parties (see Exhibit HRM 17 at paras. 39, 44). The point, nonetheless, was not clarified. This is confirmed by the judge himself and clear from the modified order, which explicity says that nothing in „this order“ (i.e. the UK AASI order, not the Final relief) bars the Appellants from pursuing their actions before the UPC. Urgency 83. The Order was also urgently needed, because Applicants cannot be referred to the main proceedings, which will take several months before concluding with a a decision. That the UK courts are prepared to render ex-parte A(A)SIs is witnessed by the UK High Court’s order of 20 October 2025, which was issued in the course of a few days. Even if granting an interim-licence would take longer, it would still come well before a decision on the merits in main proceedings before the UPC. Enforcement warning 84. According to the latest Order of the UPC Court of Appeal (Order of 14 October 2025, UPC CoA 699/2025 – FUJI/Kodak), which was issued after the impugned Order, this order had to include a clear warning in accordance with the enforcement scheme developed in that decision. For the Order to be in full compliance with that case law, it had to be adapted, which is possible at any time of the enforcement stage. According to this jurisprudence, an UPC decision is not to be respected out of itself and no sanctions can follow automatically in case of disobedience like it is the case for the UK Penalty Order, but the UPC CoA held that a clear penalty order is to be included in the order or decision on the merits as this enhances legal certainty. A penalty may only be ordered, if such order finds its basis in a prior penalty order having been made. This follows from the wording of Rule 354.4 RoP. Due to the serious effects of any measure imposed on the Applicants upon application of the Respondents by the UK courts on the Applicants‘ patent rights, the penalties contained in the warning of the court had to be equally severe so as to guarantee compliance of the Respondents with the order. The Respondents already applied for an ASI in Brazil and applied for the UK order disregarding the clear scope of this Order. The full possible economic effects upon Applicants were clarified during the oral hearing, where Exhibit AR 27 was submitted. 36 85. The penalty amount that may be forfeited shall be set by the Court, considering the importance of the order in question. This amount should be sufficiently deterrent to be coercive, but also within reasonable limits for it to be an appropriate (proportionate) penalty (UPC CoA Order of 14 October 2025, UPC_CoA_699/2025, Headnote 4). The penalty order must also specify upon which occurrence a certain penalty sum may be forfeited, e.g. as a lump sum or (preferably) for non-compliance per specified time period, per item, per act, etc. Where appropriate, the penalty order may also set a maximum amount of penalties that may be forfeited per order or overall. This, however, does not prevent the Court from increasing such maximum amount in any further order, e.g. in enforcement proceedings for future further non-compliance, if the circumstances oft he case so require (R. 354.3. RoP) (UPC CoA ibid. Headnote 5). Taking into consideration that the sum in dispute of the cases EP2548372 (UPC_CFI_1481/2025), EP3240285 (UPC_CFI_1482/2025), concerning „only“ non-SEPs, already amounts to 8 Million € and 5 Million € and further taking into account the vast list of relevant EPs of Exhibit AR10 containing more than 150 relevant EPs (SEPs and non-SEPs) and further taking into consideration the amounts included in Exhibit AR 27, the penalty to be payable to the court so as to have a sufficiently deterrent effect and still to be proportionate isset to up to a maximum of 50.000.000 €. The sum has to be set an amount, which does also encompass a severe breach as – according to the UPC CoA – the Court may only deviate therefrom in favour of the defendant but may not increase the penalty contained in the warning. Therefore, so as to catch also severe breaches, the sum has to be set sufficiently high. 86. In the case of any continuation of such breach, after the initial penalty was set and such penalty order was served upon Respondents, for each further day of non-compliance the additional fee payable to the court is set to up to 500.000 € per day. 87. The court reserves the right to further increase these penalties in case of continued noncompliance and in case of penalty payments should be imposed on the Applicants by any foreign court. 37 Information of EU authorities Due to the possible effects of this dispute on EU antitrust law, taking into account Art. 1 and 20 UPCA and Art. 101, 102 TFEU , the EU Commission had to be informed of this decision according to Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, Art. 6 and 15(2) (ECJ 28 February 1991 – C-234/89, – Delimitis/Henninger Bräu; ECJ 2 October 2003 – C-172/01 P, – International Power – NALOO). For the avoidance of any doubts, it is emphasized before the background of the sealed Penalty Order of the UK High Court and the warning expressed in the course of the UK High Court hearing of 25 November 2025 (Exhibit HRM 16, p. 34 et seqq. and p. 142: “I would be very, very disappointed, if Inter Digital has got any thoughts of prompting any other court to act of its own volition. That would be very much contrary to the spirit of all that has been said, and indeed the order potentially.), that the Panel informs the EU authorities of its own volition without any further influence from Applicants as it is bound to do so under EU law. ORDER I. The impugned Order of 30 September 2025 is confirmed. II. Respondents application to review the Order of 30 September 2025 is rejected. III. The impugned Order remains in force and enforceable under the conditions of the Order of 30 September 2025. IV. In case any or all of the Respondents disobey this Order, a penalty of up to 50.000.000 € may be set. V. For each day of further non-compliance with one or more Orders mentioned under IV. of this Order, a penalty of up to 500.000 € per day may be set. VI. Respondents bear the costs of these proceedings. VII. The EU Commission is to be furnished with a copy of this Order and the Order of 30 September 2025 by the Registry of the Court. 38 Issued in Mannheim on 22 December 2025 NAMES AND SIGNATURES Tochtermann Presiding judge and judge-rapporteur Böttcher Legally qualified judge Kupecz Legally qualified judge For the Sub-Registrar: Kranz, Clerk LD Mannheim Information about appeal An appeal against the present Order may be lodged at the Court of Appeal, by any party which has been unsuccessful, in whole or in part, in its submissions, within 15 days of the date of its notification (Art. 73(1) UPCA, R. 220.1(c), 224.1(a) RoP). 39 Information about enforcement (Art. 82 UPCA, R. 158.2, 354 RoP) The order is enforceable under the conditions set out in this Order and the Order of 30 September 2025.

Key Holdings

The Local Division Mannheim granted an ex parte anti-suit injunction, forbidding Amazon from seeking or enforcing an interim license in the UK, deeming such action a violation of InterDigital's right to pursue patent infringement proceedings in the UPC.
The Court ruled that the relief sought by Amazon in the UK constituted an anti-suit injunction that would violate the “ordre public” of the European Union and the fundamental right of the patentee to enforce its patents.
The Local Division stipulated severe fines for any violation of the order, up to €50 million, with an additional €500,000 per day.
The decision in review proceedings confirmed the ex parte order's applicability to the main rate-setting proceedings in the UK, despite subsequent modifications by the UK court.
The commentator expressed doubts regarding the 'ordre public' and TRIPS arguments, questioning the necessity and desirability of such drastic measures given the existing RAND agreement between the parties and principles of international comity.

UPC_CFI_935/2025 – InterDigital v Amazon

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